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We develop a stylized model that captures the phenomena of decoupling and recoupling in an environment
where heterogeneous entrepreneurial sectors face financial constraints in their relationship with a common
set of lenders. In response to adverse shocks, a financially constrained sector must reduce its borrowing
and cut down on production. In particular, as the constrained sector absorbs less and less capital, the
real interest rate in the economy declines. Other sectors that compete for the same inputs (including
capital) thus experience lower costs, which boosts investment, output, and profits, reflecting the phenomenon
of "decoupling." As long as the shock is small, the entrepreneurial sector repays what is owed and
the lenders' ability to supply funds is unaffected. For large shocks, however, the constrained sector
is no longer able to honor its debts in full and lenders experience losses that erode their lending base.
This induces them to cut their supply of credit to the rest of the economy, which reduces output and
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nancial crisis that has engulfed the world over the past three years
started out in a relatively small set of sectors in a select number of countries,
particularly the real estate sector in the United States. The rise in U.S. in-
terest rates from about 1 to 5 percent between 2004 and 2006 combined with
excessively lax lending standards triggered a wave of defaults on mortgages {
particularly in the sub-prime sector { that led to a slowdown in the housing
market. As illustrated in Figure 1, Panel A, housing starts peaked in early 2006
and have fallen dramatically ever since. At rst (February 2007 to May 2008),
however, nancial problems seemed to stay conned to the sectors and coun-
tries in which they originated, with little repercussion on other sectors in the
United States or on emerging countries. Business loans from commercial banks
in the United States, for instance, continued to increase steadily throughout
this period (Panel A). And, if anything, capital inows into emerging coun-
tries became stronger (Panel B). In fact, policymakers in the developing world
would brag about this \decoupling" from the United States as a sign of the
economic maturity reached by their domestic economies.1 This period of de-
coupling is also evident from looking at corporate bond yields in the United
States (Panel C) and sovereign bond prices for emerging markets (Panel D),
both of which remained relatively unaected during this period. The decou-
pling, however, began to unravel starting around May 2008 { and particularly
after the collapse of Lehman (September 15, 2008) { as the nancial crisis
began to spread like wildre, aecting countries all around the world, with
asset and stock prices collapsing in unison. In the United States, business
loans plummeted (Panel A) and corporate yields spiked violently (Panel C).
In emerging markets, capital inows collapsed and bond prices fell dramati-
cally (Panel D).2
1In mid-September 2008, Brazil's president, Lula da Silva, was quoted as saying \What
crisis? Go ask Bush." A few weeks later, Brazil's stock market and currency plummeted
by 20 and 13 percent, respectively (Bloomberg.com, December 3, 2008, \Lula, Like Bush,
Gives Bad Shopping Advice").
2This \decoupling-recoupling" sequence is well documented in Dooley and Hutchinson
(2009) for emerging markets as a whole and in Izquierdo and Talvi (2009) for Latin America.
2Figure 1: Decoupling and Recoupling During the Global Crisis of 2008-2010
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Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, U.S. Census Bureau, and Inter-American Development Bank
3This paper develops a stylized model of decoupling and recoupling that cap-
tures these phenomena in an environment where heterogeneous entrepreneurial
sectors face nancial constraints in their relationship with a common set of
lenders. In response to adverse shocks, a nancially constrained sector must
reduce its borrowing and cut down on production. In particular, as the
constrained sector absorbs less and less capital, the real interest rate in the
economy declines. Other sectors that compete for the same inputs (including
capital) thus experience lower costs, which boosts investment, output, and
prots, reecting the phenomenon of \decoupling." As long as the shock is
small, the entrepreneurial sector repays what is owed and the lenders' ability
to supply funds is unaected. If the adverse shock exceeds a certain threshold,
however, the constrained sector is no longer able to honor its debts in full and
lenders experience losses that erode their lending base. This induces them to
cut their supply of credit to the rest of the economy, which reduces output
and prot for all other entrepreneurial sectors, capturing the phenomenon of
\recoupling" or contagion.3
1 Model
We assume an economy with one homogenous consumption/investment good
that spans over two time periods t = 1;2. The economy consists of a combined
household/banking sector that provides nance and values consumption, and
N entrepreneurial sectors that access nance to engage in production and value
nal prots.4 We can interpret this set-up alternatively as a world in which
(i) households provide nance to N dierent countries through global capital
markets or (ii) a closed economy with N dierent productive sectors.
3For empirical documentation that episodes of contagion typically involve common
lenders, see Kaminsky, Reinhart, and V egh (2003).
4For analytical simplicity, we combine households and banks in our model. As discussed
below, our results would be magnied if we separated the two sectors and allowed for leverage
in the banking sector.
41.1 Household/Banking Sector
The consolidated household/banking sector consists of a continuum of identical
agents that have an exogenous and constant endowment e per period and con-
sume ct, which provides utility according to the function U = log(c1)+log(c2).
A representative household obtains repayments R1d1 from the entrepreneurial
sectors at the beginning of period 1, where d1 is the total amount owed by
the entrepreneurs and R1 is an average gross real interest rate. The household
also provides d2 in loans to the entrepreneurial sectors at a gross real interest
rate of R2 to be repaid in period 2. We assume that d1 > 0 to ensure that




log(e + R1d1   d2) + log(e + R2d2); (1)





It is easy to show that c1 is a decreasing function of R2.5 Since
d2 = e + R1d1   c1; (2)
this implies that d2, the supply of loans to entrepreneurs in period 1, is in-
creasing in R2. Further, a reduction in d1 will shift leftward the supply of
loans for a given R2.
1.2 Entrepreneurial Sector
We assume that each of the N entrepreneurial sectors consists of a continuum
of identical entrepreneurs of mass 1 that are risk-neutral and value their prots
i, which they consume at the end of period 2, according to the linear utility
5As shown in the appendix, this result holds for more general utility functions under
certain regularity conditions.
5function Ui = i (i = 1;::;N). Let di
1 be the initial debt obligation of a
representative entrepreneur in sector i and Ri
1 the corresponding gross real
interest rate.6 The entrepreneur enters period 1 with a predetermined debt
obligation of Ri
1di










1 is a predetermined level of capital that fully depreciates at the end of period
1, and F () is a decreasing returns-to-scale production function.7 If production
is insucient to cover the debt, the entrepreneur goes bankrupt and lenders






















1 is the actual payment. Hence, the total repayments from the N
entrepreneurial sectors to households is R1d1 = Ri
1 ^ di
1.





















The entrepreneur then decides how much debt di
2 to issue as a function
of R2 and how much to invest in next-period production. Total period 2








This capital investment produces period 2 output of Ai
2F (ki
2), where we set
for simplicity Ai
2 = A 8 i. This implies that we can rule out bankruptcy in
period 2.
However, we assume that there is a moral hazard problem in period 1, which
imposes a credit limit on di
2. After having borrowed in period 1, a producer has
an opportunity to move the project into a scam that hides income in period
6We index Ri
1 by i because, even though this falls outside the scope of our model, dierent
sectors could have faced dierent gross real interest rates in light of the possibility of default.
7Alternatively, the value of Ai
1 could be interpreted as the outcome of a random produc-
tivity shock that was realized before we begin our analysis.
62. Creditors can challenge this in court but can recover at most a fraction
[=(1 + )] 2 (0;1) of the entrepreneur's total assets because of imperfect
enforcement. To avoid losses from potential fraud, creditors limit the amount













The optimization problem of a representative entrepreneur in sector i con-
sists of choosing di
2 to maximize prots subject to the borrowing constraint






















i is the shadow price on the borrowing constraint. The problem results







= R2 + 
i:
If the constraint is loose, this reduces to the standard neoclassical condition.
Entrepreneurs invest and borrow optimally:
k







2 (R2)   n
i
1: (3)
The optimal capital stock is independent of individual-specic variables and




unc = AF (k
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where it is straightforward to show that @i=@ni
1 > 0 and @i=@R2 < 0 as long
as the entrepreneur is a net borrower, i.e. ni
1 < k
2 (R2).
If the constraint is binding, a wedge opens between the entrepreneur's cost
of funds and the marginal product, in which case the level of borrowing and








2 = (1 + )n
i
1:
7The capital stock is now independent of the real interest rate in the economy













which also satises @i=@ni
1 > 0 and @i=@R2 < 0.
Note that if ni
1 = 0 because of bankruptcy in period 1, the entrepreneur
cannot borrow and invest due to the constraint, and thus produces and con-
sumes zero in period 2.
2 Equilibrium
For given initial conditions, a decentralized equilibrium in the economy consists




i=1 that is a solution to the maximization problems of
the household/banking and the entrepreneurial sectors and satises the market




Our characterization of the economy's equilibrium allows us to study the
phenomena of decoupling and recoupling. For simplicity, we assume there are
two productive sectors labeled by i = X;Z, of which sector Z has a value of AZ
1
that is suciently high so as to be always unconstrained during the ensuing
experiment. We study how the equilibrium changes as we vary the productivity




for given initial capital and debt positions. To
capture the traditional role of entrepreneurs as net demanders of nance, we
assume that the initial debt and capital levels of both entrepreneurial sectors
are such that they remain net borrowers in period 1.
2.1 Unconstrained Economy
If period 1 productivity in sector X is suciently high AX
1  AX
unc, the sector
is unconstrained and the economy follows standard neoclassical rules. The
8threshold AX
unc is determined by the productivity level AX
1 that leads to a











1 in period 1
and supply loans according to (2), and both entrepreneurial sectors demand
loans according to their optimality condition (3).
Within this region, greater sector X productivity means higher entrepreneurial
net worth nX
1 and therefore a lower demand for loans dX
2 (R2). As a result, the
interest rate R2 declines, and the optimum amount of investment as well as
prots in both sectors increase. A positive shock in sector X therefore spills
over positively to sector Z.
2.2 Decoupling
If the productivity of sector X drops below AX
unc, the sector becomes con-
strained. As long as net worth nX
1 is positive, the sector can honor its repay-
ments and households receive the promised amount R1d1 in period 1. This is
















Within this region, lower period 1 productivity for a constrained entrepreneur
tightens the constraint, leads to lower loan demand and a lower interest rate
R2. Sector Z reacts by increasing investment and prots, i.e., a negative shock
in sector X spills over positively to sector Z. The worse the productivity shock
for sector X, the better o is sector Z { there is decoupling.8
8Note that there are two eects on the welfare of sector X: on the one hand, it is hurt
by the binding constraint, but on the other hand it benets from the lower interest rate.
The net eect of the two can initially be positive. However, as productivity declines further
and the sector approaches the bankruptcy threshold, sectoral welfare will unambiguously
decline until it reaches zero at the threshold.
9Figure 2: Decoupling and Recoupling





























. With sector X being wiped out, period 1 produc-
tivity in this region aects directly the capital position of households/bankers.
A lower period 1 productivity for a constrained entrepreneur reduces period
1 wealth of households/bankers, which makes them less willing to lend and
increases the interest rate R2 that they charge. As a result, sector Z invests
less and obtains lower prots. Within this region, negative shocks to sector X
spill over negatively to sector Z { there is recoupling (i.e., contagion).
3 Illustration
In Figure 2, we illustrate the three regions that arise as we reduce the produc-
tivity parameter AX
1 from  A (= 1:3) to 0:2 (i.e., as we move from right to left):
unconstrained, decoupling, and recoupling, each separated by a dotted vertical
line. We use F (k) =
p
k for the production function and set the following
parameters:  = :5, e = 0, A = 1:2, AZ
1 = 1, ki
1 = 1, and Ri
1di
1 = :5 in each
10sector i.
For high values of the productivity parameter AX
1 , i.e., to the right of
the gure, both sectors are unconstrained and lower productivity in sector X
decreases prots (i.e., welfare) in both sectors as the cost of capital increases.
In the center of the gure, there is decoupling: since the demand for loans
of sector X is progressively constrained, the interest rate declines and sector
Z is better o. In the left region of the gure, sector X goes bankrupt and
the supply of loans to the entrepreneurial sector is reduced, pushing up the
interest rate R2.9 This hurts sector Z, i.e., there is recoupling.
4 Extensions
There are several dimensions in which our benchmark model can be extended
to provide further insights:
(i) Dynamics In the recent nancial crisis, decoupling and recoupling oc-
curred sequentially, whereas in our model we are, strictly speaking, con-
ducting a comparative statics exercise. In a multi-period version of our
model, recoupling could occur after an episode of decoupling, if a series
of adverse shocks progressively depletes the net worth of a constrained
sector to the point where it is pushed into bankruptcy.
(ii) Factor Prices In our benchmark model, the only factor of production
is capital. More generally, other factors, such as labor or commodities,
are complements to capital in standard production functions. The less
capital is employed in the economy, the lower is the demand for other
factors. This would lead to a fall in commodity prices and, in labor
markets with sticky wages, to unemployment.
9Note that this channel of transmission is consistent with the evidence presented in Figure
1, where we can see that business loans begin to fall (Panel A) and corporate yield rates
spike sharply (Panel C) at the begining of the recoupling period.
11Figure 3: Recoupling with Bankruptcy Costs

















(iii) Bankruptcy Costs If we add to our model bankruptcy costs that reduce
the recovery rate on assets seized by banks by a factor  in case of
bankruptcy, then there is a discontinuity at Afail that would cause the
interest rate to jump up and welfare to fall, magnifying the impact of
defaults. An example of this is given in Figure 3.
(iv) Leveraged Banks Modifying our benchmark model by separating house-
holds and the banking sector and introducing leverage in the latter can
amplify the propagation of defaults. Leverage implies that the impact
of a shock on the net worth of banks is magnied. Hence, if banks ex-
perienced nancial constraints in their relationship with households, our
contagion results would be strengthened.
(v) Eciency Considerations In the framework we have described in this
paper, the decentralized equilibrium is constrained-ecient, since there
are no actions that a planner could undertake to coordinate the economy
on a better equilibrium. However, if we introduce additional degrees of
freedom for our agents, such as the possibility to choose the amount
of initial debt, ineciencies may arise. This is particularly the case if
12there are relative prices, such as exchange rates or asset prices, that are
adversely aected by contagion dynamics (see e.g. Korinek, 2010).
We explore these extensions in more detail in our companion paper (Ko-
rinek, Roitman and V egh, 2010).
5 Conclusions
We have presented a stylized model that captures the decoupling-recoupling
phenomenon observed after the subprime crisis erupted in the United States
in February 2007 There are two \sectors" in our model that experience rst
decoupling and then recoupling as productivity falls in one of them. These
two sectors could be given a literal interpretation (i.e., the real estate and
manufacturing sectors within a country being nanced by the nancial sector)
or a broader interpretation in terms of dierent countries (i.e., United States
and Brazil being nanced by international capital markets). In our companion
paper, we embed this mechanism in a model with leverage and show how this
decoupling-recoupling cycle is further amplied.
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6 Mathematical Appendix
6.1 Household/Banking Sector
For general utility functions, the rst order condition to the optimization prob-
lem of the household/banking sector (1) is
u
0 (c1) = R2u
0 (c2):





u0 (c2) + R2d2u00 (c2)
u00 (c1) + R2u00 (c2)
:
Since the denominator is negative, this expression is unambiguously positive
as long as the following condition is met:
Condition 1
@R2u0(c2)
@R2 = u0 (c2) + R2d2u00 (c2) > 0
Intuitively, the condition states that the consumer's marginal period 2 util-
ity from lending in period 1 responds positively to higher interest rates { the
eect consists of the (positive) marginal utility u0 (c2) gained from the higher
interest rate minus the (negative) indirect eect that the marginal utility de-
clines at rate u00 (c2) as consumption rises.
There are two alternative sucient conditions under which the condition is
satised. First, it is met whenever the curvature of the households utility func-
tion as measured by the coecient of risk aversion u00 ()=u0 () is suciently
14low so that increases in consumption do not depress the marginal utility at too
fast of a rate. This is for example the case for log-utility as in our specication
of the household's problem in (1). For that case we nd that
u










since the payment obtained R2d2 < e + R2d2 = c2 and the fraction is always
less than one.
Secondly, the condition is met for arbitrary utility functions whenever the
amount lent d2 is suciently low. For example, for the class of CRRA utility
functions with a coecient of relative risk aversion , we nd
u
0 (c2) + R2d2u









As long as d2 is suciently low so that R2d2 < c2, the condition is satised.
For the standard value  = 2 that is often chosen in the literature, the repay-
ment received has to constitute less than half of total consumption. This is
generally satised in models where households derive approximately two thirds
of their income from labor.






u0 (c2) + R2d2u00 (c2)
:
This derivative is negative whenever condition 1 is met, as is the case for the
log-utility that we used in problem (1).
15